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CONTRACT SPECIFICITY AND ITS PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS 
 ABSTRACT 
Governance theories like Transaction Cost Economics argue that systematic deviations from an 
attribute-governance alignment should influence performance. This paper investigates the performance 
implications of contract specificity for the procurement of Information Technology (IT) products. We 
argue that parties choose a level of contract specificity that economizes on both the ex ante contracting 
costs and the ex post transaction costs and that deviations between the observed and expected levels of 
contract specificity are an important determinant of these transaction costs. We test the hypotheses 
using a comprehensive archival dataset of IT transactions and employ a two-step estimation procedure. 
First, we estimate the "expected" level of contract specificity that account for key transactional 
attributes. We then study the consequences of deviating from this expected level of contractual 
specificity. We find that “unexpected” specificity in contracts reduces ex post transaction problems but 
increases ex ante contracting costs. The results provide the first explicit demonstration of the trade-off 
between upfront contracting costs and ex post transaction problems and suggest that parties have to 
economize jointly on these costs while choosing the governance form. Implications for research and 
practice are drawn.  
 
Keywords: Business-to-business marketing, Contracts, Relationship marketing, Transaction Cost 
Economics 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governance theories like transaction cost economics (TCE) have been primarily used to shed light on 
the design of buyer-seller relationships in a wide variety of business-to-business settings with the core 
organizing principle being that costly governance structures are consciously engineered to account for 
transactional hazards (Williamson 1985). Increasingly, researchers have focused on investigating the 
links between such governance arrangements and performance. For instance, studies show that 
relational norms and processes improve relational performance (Lusch and Brown 1996; Zaheer, 
McEvily, and Perrone 1998) and lower customer firm costs (Cannon and Homburg 2001) and that 
detailed contracts reduce opportunism but only in conjunction with close partner selection and network 
embeddedness (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). Houston and Johnson (2000), in contrast, argue and find 
that there should be no difference in performance between joint ventures and contracts. Despite these 
advances, two key gaps remain in our understanding on these governance-performance effects. 
First, a key implication of TCE’s normative rule is that if governance structures are chosen to 
account for hazards posed by transactional attributes, deviating from the proper attribute-governance 
alignment should adversely influence performance. Direct evidence of the costs of misaligned 
governance is a crucial test of the logic underlying TCE (Anderson 1988) because lack of such 
evidence provokes the question: Does governance matter? Substantively, understanding the costs of 
misaligned governance is critical to managerial practice because designing appropriate governance 
structures requires costly managerial effort and valuable organizational resources. There is however, 
scant though growing, empirical evidence on the costs of misaligned governance (exceptions include 
Anderson 1988; Berkowitz, Jap, and Nickerson 2006; Ghosh and John 2009).  
Second, and relatedly, constructing governance mechanisms is itself a costly enterprise; hence, 
their value in curbing hazards should be balanced with their upfront set-up and design costs. Extant 
research, however, provides no insights on these counter-balancing aspects and its implications for 
governance design. Understanding this inter-play between multiple dimensions of cost (e.g., between 
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ex ante design and ex post hazard costs) is of substantive importance because if ex ante design costs 
inhibit parties from choosing governance forms that reduce the costs of ex post hazards, managers 
need to be cognizant of these trade-offs while they strategically design governance ties. 
We address these two key questions in this paper. Specifically, our goal is to investigate (a) 
whether systematic departure from the theoretically predicted level of governance influences ex ante 
and ex post costs and (b) whether the impact of this deviation suggests a trade-off between ex ante 
contracting costs and ex post hazards. To test these objectives, we use a two-step approach in the 
context of procurement contracts between buying firms and vendors of information technology (IT) 
products/services. To set-up our key hypotheses, we first use TCE to argue that lock-in, transaction 
complexity, and measurement ambiguity concerns determine the level of specificity, or detail, in these 
IT contracts. This provides us the expected (or predicted) level of contract specificity that accounts for 
these transactional hazards. We then construct the deviation between the observed1 and the predicted 
contract specificity and test the impact of this deviation on two distinct but counter-balancing 
dimensions of performance, viz. ex ante contracting costs and ex post transaction costs. The joint 
analysis of these two types of costs represents the core trade-off far-sighted managers have to make; 
i.e. construct contracts that are not too costly to design, yet are specific enough to reduce ex post 
hazards.  
The analysis on a comprehensive archival dataset of procurement contracts between Dutch 
buying firms and their IT vendors provides strong support to our thesis. Contract specificity increases 
with buyer lock-in and transaction complexity but decreases with ambiguity in measuring the quality 
of the product. After accounting for this endogeneity, we find that deviations from the expected level 
of specificity have a contrasting pattern of impact on costs. Specifically, contracts that are more (less) 
specific than expected lower (raise) ex post transaction costs but raise (lower) ex ante contracting 
costs. We obtain these results even after using a stronger test that controls for heterogeneous firm-
specific effects.  In essence, we find that attempts to lower ex post costs, by designing contracts that 
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are more detailed than expected, increase ex ante contracting costs and vice versa, suggesting that 
parties that seek to over-coordinate (i.e. make contracts more specific than necessary) or under-
coordinate (i.e. make contracts less specific than necessary) need to balance the ex ante with ex post 
costs vis-à-vis their theory predicted levels. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
jointly investigate and demonstrate this important trade-off between ex ante contracting costs and ex 
post transaction costs and its joint implications on contract design.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The Role of Contracts 
Exchange is central to marketing and a contract is an agreement between parties involved in the 
exchange of a product or service.  Contracts can be explicit, legal agreements or implicit, normative 
agreements (Macneil 1980); regardless, their central purpose is to define the subject matter of the 
exchange in sufficient detail to create a shared set of rules, procedures, responsibilities, and 
expectations (Gilson 1984; Lusch and Brown 1996).  The creation of these shared expectations, or 
“meeting of the minds”, is of value in both simple and complex transactions.  For instance, in simple 
exchanges a contract might specify the product, its price, and its delivery schedule.  In contrast, in 
volatile environments where delineating future conditions, time horizons, and potential contingent 
responses is a formidable task, a contract not only creates a common language that conveys 
information (e.g., price, technical specifications, warranties, etc.) but also identifies mutually agreeable 
set of rights, duties, and responsibilities and how parties will interact and deal with each other (Hill 
and King 2004).  The creation of this common language and homogeneous expectations, through both 
legal (i.e. explicit) and extra-legal (i.e. normative or social) terms, helps curb wasteful renegotiation 
and other strategic behavior.  As such, contracts become mechanisms that create value by reducing the 
risk and uncertainty in exchange relationships (Lusch and Brown 1996). 
A Schema of Contract Specificity 
In technology markets where technical change is rapid and products/services are tailored to customer 
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needs, these contracts often go beyond a boilerplate “bill of sale” and are specifically constructed to 
reflect exchange characteristics.  These “customized” contracts may detail, for instance, the level of 
coordination, potential adjustments, and implementation activities that need be undertaken. Our focus 
is on the presentiation (Macneil 1980) or the extent to which these formal contract terms vary in their 
level of specificity or explicitness. In more specific contracts parties attempt to explicitly state, at the 
contracting date, how they would handle/resolve various situations that might occur in the future. For 
instance, the contract might specify the price determination process (e.g. Crocker and Masten 1991; 
Goldberg and Erickson 1987) or specify the kinds of adjustment procedures to used (e.g. Bajari, 
McMillan and Tadelis 2008).  Given the difficulty of elucidating future contingencies and the costs of 
constructing detailed contracts, this is not a trivial task. 
Governance logic dictates that the appropriate level of contract specificity is one that balances 
two countervailing factors: The ex ante costs of drafting contracts that are more specific with the ex 
post costs of keeping contract terms open (Crocker and Masten 1991; Ghosh and John 2005).  The ex 
ante costs include the costs borne in managerial time and effort in searching for information, projecting 
future scenarios, identifying feasible contingencies, and negotiating mutually acceptable solutions. The 
ex post costs are the problems encountered in the execution and implementation stages (e.g., delay in 
delivery, improper specification, etc).  Crafting more detailed clauses that clarify the roles and 
responsibilities reduces potential misunderstandings and safeguard investments by discouraging the 
counter-party from engaging in ex post opportunistic re-negotiations (Wathne and Heide 2000). In 
contrast, keeping contract terms open enables ex post value-enhancing adjustments but also gives the 
counter-party an opportunity to exploit unspecified loopholes that lead to higher ex post problems.  
This inter-play between ex ante and ex post costs is the key design issue when parties choose 
the level of contract specificity. For simple transactions (e.g., purchase of X units of a PC or a 
standardized software), the ex post trading hazards are likely to be low, reducing the value of writing 
more specific contracts. The upfront costs of writing precise terms are also likely to be trivial. In 
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contrast, for more complex transactions (e.g., purchase of customized hardware/software that create 
lock-in), far-sighted parties anticipating higher levels of ex post problems are likely to write more 
detailed clauses that specify contingencies, roles and responsibilities. The upfront costs of constructing 
such complex contracts, however, are also likely to be high. The desired level of specificity, then, is 
one where the contracting party trades-off between the costs of specifying more contingencies with the 
gains from safeguarding against potential problems. Said differently, for a given exogenous level of 
transactional attributes, the level of contract specificity and the expected ex ante and ex post costs are 
joint outcomes.  We now proceed to apply this schema to our context of IT contracts. 
The IT Buying Context and the Specificity of IT contracts 
Our context pertains to procurement contracts for IT hardware/software between buying firms that 
operate in a wide range of industry sectors, and their respective IT vendor.2  This context is interesting 
for four reasons.  First, customer firms, regardless of the industry sector they compete in, use IT 
products and services in a wide variety of administrative/operational activities to enhance productivity 
and effectiveness.  Second, these products have a “multiplier effect”. Specifically, (a) if the product is 
flawed, unable to operate per requirements, or incompatible with other IT systems on the customer’s 
premises, or (b) if post-sales implementation issues like adjustments to product configurations on-site, 
installation, and service support are improper, the opportunity costs to the customer of lost 
productivity can be substantial and larger than the capitalized value of the product.3   
Third, IT product markets are characterized by significant inter-generational improvement in 
hardware/software and proprietary technologies that not only add considerable ambiguity in  assessing 
their quality but also induce potential lock-in  (e.g. Weiss and Heide 1993) and require extensive 
coordination between the parties. Finally, compared to on-going supply relationships that have a series 
of recurring transactions (e.g., manufacturer-component supplier, manufacturer-distributor/retailer) 
which permit the evolution of relational norms to support exchanges, capital IT purchases of rapidly 
obsolescing products are lumpier, or discrete, in nature with the focus being “to ensure that 
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expectations are realized” in that specific transaction (Kern and Willcocks 2001).  Under these 
circumstances, one can expect managers to expend considerable time and effort in choosing products 
and governing those transactions with appropriate contract terms.  
We use “contract specificity” to indicate the extent to which contract terms with respect to a) 
technical specifications of the product, b) implementation procedures, c) financial and legal 
considerations, and d) overall contractual features, are specified in detail ex ante.  Our measure taps 
into the buying firm’s perspective on the contract governing the exchange and is similar to one used in 
previous research on relational contracting (e.g. Lusch and Brown 1996; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005).  
A high level of specificity means that contract terms with respect to the four features are more detailed 
and explicit.  Likewise, a low level of specificity means that these terms are less detailed and explicit. 
Safeguarding Buyer Lock-In:  We define buyer lock-in as the difficulty faced by the buyer in 
switching or replacing products or suppliers (Dutta et al. 1995). Such lock-in gets generated when 
buyers make supplier-specific investments (Weiss and Anderson 1992). For instance, in IT markets, 
buying firms often purchase a vendor’s products that are unique and embody proprietary technologies 
(John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999; Heide and Weiss 1995).  Likewise, specialized human assets also create 
lock-in because the buyer’s personnel have to develop specialized skills and knowledge to derive 
productive output from that vendor’s product (Williamson 1985).  Lock-in implies higher switching 
costs and increases the hazards of opportunistic behavior by the vendor (Houston and Johnson 2000). 
For instance, knowing that the buyer cannot easily switch to another vendor, the focal supplier might 
demand price or delivery concessions or not be prompt enough in providing post-sales implementation 
support.  Farsighted buyers, realizing their vulnerability under higher lock-in, expend effort to draft 
formal contract terms that spell out roles and responsibilities in specific details and discourage rent-
dissipating effort (Stump and Heide 1996); in effect, these contracts will be less flexible to provide 
better safeguards (Heide 1994).  Drafting contracts with specific details, in turn, will require costly 
investment in time and managerial resources for expounding the contingencies 
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and constructing effective rules to manage those contingencies.  Overall, we hypothesize: 
H1:  The greater the buyer lock-in, the more specific the contract, all else equal. 
Managing Transaction Complexity:  IT transactions often involve purchase of hardware, 
software, and services that are architecturally inter-dependent (Bensaou and Anderson 1999) and 
hence require coordination during the design and implementation stages. We define transaction 
complexity as the need for coordination between the parties to produce the desired final product or 
service.  Higher levels of transaction complexity create three types of transactional hazards.  First, it 
introduces uncertainty about the cause of product failure making it difficult to apportion blame 
(Anderson and Dekker 2005; Masten and Snyder 1993) and leads to costly renegotiations (Crocker and 
Masten 1991).  Second, it makes it more difficult to generate a mutually agreeable “meeting of the 
minds”, expectations, and responsibilities (Lusch and Brown 1996; Stump and Heide 1996).  Third, it 
increases implementation problems ex post, especially if appropriate governance structures that detail 
the desired level of coordination and communication between the parties are not set (Sanchez and 
Mahoney 1996).  For instance, ex post adjustments are likely to be higher, the more the number of 
hardware, software, or service products procured under the contract.  More specific contracts that 
detail the implementation procedures or financial and legal obligations of the parties then serve as a 
form of vertical control (Klein 1989) that mitigate the hazards arising from transaction complexity. In 
turn, higher managerial effort has to be expended in drafting such details. Hence, we posit: 
H2:  The greater the transaction complexity, the more specific the contract, all else equal.  
Managing Measurement Ambiguity: We define measurement ambiguity as the difficulty of 
defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products procured in the contract (Anderson and Dekker 
2005).  Given bounded rationality, greater ambiguity in measurement makes it more difficult to assess 
the contractual compliance by the vendor (Heide and John 1990; Stump and Heide 1996).  This in turn 
is likely to increase the buyer’s hazards.  For instance, the vendor might shirk and not provide the 
expected level of implementation and post sales service support (Houston and Johnson 2000) or might 
  
 
9 
deliver products that do not match buyer requirements leading to mal-adaptation costs and productivity 
losses (Wathne and Heide 2000). In such circumstances, far-sighted buyers would seek to exert control 
(Weiss and Anderson 1992) and construct more detailed contract terms. This need to manage 
transaction hazards through more comprehensive contracting, however, is countervailed by an 
increasing difficulty in explicating appropriate contractual provisions (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997); 
hence, the ex ante effort in crafting more specific contracts should also increase with measurement 
ambiguity (Saussier 2000).  Overall, we hypothesize: 
H3:  The greater the measurement ambiguity, the more specific the contract, all else equal.  
Performance Implications 
We now turn to investigate the implications of contract specificity on two dimensions of performance.  
The first, ex post transaction costs, refers to the degree to which the buying firm encountered problems 
in the contract execution and implementation stage. These problems, among others, include (a) price 
exceeding expectations, (b) deliveries going beyond schedule, (c) products/services being incomplete, 
incompatible with other IT products/systems, or unable to perform per requirements, (d) installation 
and on-site customization being inappropriate or sloppy and (e) inadequate service support.  Buying 
firms would clearly want to reduce these problems to prevent disruption of their operational activities.  
The second dimension, ex ante contracting costs, refers to the managerial effort expended at the 
contracting stage to detail the terms and provisions in the contract.  These costs not only include the 
nominal cost of writing the agreement but also the costs of specifying their needs, seeking information, 
and negotiating with the counter-party (Saussier 2000).  Managers at buying firms would be cognizant 
of not expending unnecessary effort in detailing these contracts. 
H1 – H3 predict how shifts in attributes influence the level of contract specificity. Critically, 
this expected level of specificity is endogenously chosen to jointly account for both the ex ante costs 
and ex post problems for a given level of transactional attributes. Hence, to understand the 
performance effects of this choice, it would be misleading to posit a priori a direct relationship 
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between the observed level of contract specificity and performance without accounting for the 
transactional attributes (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; Shaver 1998). Note that, for a variety of factors 
including corporate-specific culture/policies, strategic thinking, managerial experience, managerial 
inertia and/or myopia, and random noise, the observed level could be different from the expected level 
of contract specificity.4  Our primary goal here is not to ask why these deviations exist but to 
investigate the impact of these deviations on exchange performance.   
We argue that systematic deviation between the expected and observed levels of contract 
specificity is an important determinant of performance. In particular, when the observed level is lower 
than expected (i.e. the deviation is negative), the ex post costs would be magnified because the lower 
than expected level of details increases the likelihood of genuine misunderstanding between the parties 
on contract terms and procedures as well as of partner opportunism (Heide 1994; Wuyts and Geyskens 
2005). In effect, the transaction is under-coordinated and under-safeguarded. In contrast, when the 
observed level is higher than expected (i.e. the deviation is positive), the ex post costs are likely to be 
lower because such contracts are more likely to be enforced by third parties (e.g., courts) which 
increases the incentives to abide by the terms of the contract. Such over-coordinated and over-
safeguarded transactions are also likely to have a more detailed agreement on the responsibilities and 
expectations of the parties (Lusch and Brown 1996).  Hence, we hypothesize: 
H4:  All else equal, the more positive (negative) the difference between the observed and 
expected level of contract specificity, the lower (higher) the ex post transaction costs.  
The impact of such deviations will be the opposite on the ex ante contracting costs. In 
particular, when the observed level is lower than the expected level (i.e. the deviation is negative), the 
out-of-pocket managerial contracting costs are likely to be lower because buyer-managers would have 
expended lower effort in constructing the relevant contractual details. In contrast, when the observed 
level is higher than the expected level (i.e. the deviation is positive), contracts will be over-specified 
and the ex ante costs of writing more detailed contractual specifications are likely to increase because 
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of higher ink, search, and negotiation costs.  Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:   
H5:  All else equal, the more positive (negative) the difference between the observed and 
expected level of contract specificity, the higher (lower) the ex ante contracting costs.  
Control Variables 
A variety of factors may influence the level of contract specificity.  We include three prominent ones 
as control variables.  First, larger sized transactions are likely to exacerbate the hazards faced by the 
buyer; hence, we expect buyers to draft more specific contracts as transaction size increases (Heide 
1994).  Second, frequent prior interactions are likely to have fostered elements of trust that reduce the 
need to draft contractual safeguards; hence, we expect contracts to be less specific as frequency of 
prior interaction increases.  Finally, products that are important from the buyer’s operational and 
profitability point of view are likely to be procured under contracts that are more specific. 
METHOD 
Research Context 
We test our hypotheses using the “External Management of Automation” dataset available at the 
Steinmetz Archive (Batenburg and Raub 1995). This data was collected by the department of 
sociology at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, with the goal of examining how buying firms 
manage their IT transactions (Buskens et al. 2000). The unit of analysis is a transaction between 
buying firms in the Netherlands and vendors of IT products and services. 
 The sampling frame was obtained from Directview/Cendris, a marketing research firm 
specializing in IT that annually contacts all companies in their database to maintain up-to-date records. 
This includes about 80% of small and medium-sized Dutch firms. The study used a 3*3*4 stratified 
sampling design based on three dimensions: 3 levels of network embeddedness of the organization 
(weak, middle, and strong), 3 levels of buyer IT expertise (low, middle, and high), and 4 types of 
product groups (standard hardware, standard software, complex hardware, complex software). The 
study also used two additional selection criteria. First, they randomly selected at least 15 cases for each 
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of the 36 cells mentioned above. Second, they deliberately oversampled firms that purchased more 
innovative and complex products. Oversampling increases the precision of the estimates for complex 
hardware/software transactions but has the disadvantage that sample descriptive statistics might not be 
representative of the population. 
This procedure resulted in a list of 1,798 companies that were contacted by phone. A key 
informant approach was used to identify the individual responsible for these IT transactions. These 
individuals were then asked to identify an IT transaction with an independent vendor that met the 
aforementioned criterion of transaction complexity. Care was taken to ascertain that the key informant 
was sufficiently knowledgeable about the transaction. This procedure resulted in 1,325 usable 
organizations that were the subsequent focus of the study. 
These key informants were then administered a survey instrument with the specific transaction 
in mind. 788 individuals agreed to participate in the survey resulting in a response rate of 59% 
(788/1325). This response rate compares very favorably with other studies conducted in business-to-
business contexts. At 547 companies, the survey was administered on-site whereas in the remaining 
241 companies, it was administered using a mail survey. About 95% of the informants had 10 years of 
tenure at the company they reported on and about 10 years of experience in IT. This suggests a high 
level of global and specific competence of these informants. In an additional 183 cases, these 
informants were willing to answer a separate, independent survey on a different IT transaction. In all, 
this resulted in 971 observations. The buying firms belonged to a broad spectrum of industries, such as 
logistics, parts production, and wholesaling. More than 95% of the responses in the sample came from 
companies that had 66 to 100 full-time employees. 
Response bias was formally assessed by the comparing response rates across industries and 
regions and by comparing respondents and non-respondents on the satisfaction they reported with their 
respective transactions.5 The difference in average satisfaction between respondents (6.9 on a 10-point 
scale) and non-respondents (6.8) was statistically insignificant suggesting that non-response bias was 
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not a major concern with the data. Second, no systematic patterns of differences were observed for 
different methods of data collection methods (on-site versus mail). Finally, the original stratification 
criteria were matched with the post hoc data to check the original design goals. The results indicate 
that the stratification goals were reached.  
Measures 
Appendix 1 provides the measurement scales in our study. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics 
and some sample descriptors that shows the heterogeneity in our sample. Note that we use a 
combination of perceptual and grounded measures that reflect verifiable information. Below, we start 
with presenting the details on our endogenous variables. 
---------------------Table 1 about here--------------------- 
Endogenous variables:  
Contract specificity:  Contract specificity refers to the degree to which contract terms with 
respect to a) technical specifications of the product, b) implementation procedures, c) financial and 
legal considerations, and d) overall contractual features, are specified in detail in the contract ex ante. 
This measure is similar to those used by Lusch and Brown (1996) and Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) and 
provides the buyer’s perspective on the level to which contract terms are well specified. 
Ex post transaction costs: Ex post transaction costs are defined as the extent to which 11 
problems (details in Appendix 1) were encountered by the buying firm ex post. Different types of ex 
post problems can surface in different transactions; hence, we construct a formative scale and summate 
the perceptual severity of the problem for each of the 11 items to generate an overall measure of these 
costs. Higher values would indicate that buyers faced higher levels of these ex-post costs. 
Ex ante contracting costs:  We define ex ante contracting costs as the number of managerial 
days that were spent on crafting the details of the contracts. The range of days spent on writing 
contracts ranges from less than a day to 200 days; hence, we used a logarithmic transformation of the 
raw measure in our analysis. 
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Exogenous variables: 
Buyer lock-in:  Buyer lock-in is defined as the difficulty faced by the buyer in switching or 
replacing products or suppliers (Dutta et al. 1995). We measure it using a four-item scale that looks at 
the magnitude of costs, in time and money, the buyer would incur if the focal supplier’s product were 
to be replaced. These damages and costs relate to purchasing another product, (re) training the buyer’s 
personnel, new data and information entry, and idle production. 
Measurement ambiguity:  This measure refers to the degree of difficulty faced by the buyer in 
defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products/services procured under this contract. We use a 
three-item scale that taps into the difficulty faced by the buyer organization in judging the quality of 
the product/service at the time of delivery, in comparing the focal product/service with other products, 
and in judging the price/quality ratio of potential suppliers’ products/services. 
Transaction complexity:  This construct refers to the extent of coordination required between 
the buyer and seller to satisfactorily produce the desired final product/service. We use two separate 
indicators to measure this construct. The first indicator is a simple count of the number of products and 
services covered under the focal contract. As we see in Appendix 1, there were 18 potential types of 
products and services that could be procured in a single contract. This measure hence taps into the 
scope of the transaction with higher scope being indicative of higher transaction complexity and need 
for enhanced coordination. The second indicator rates the complexity of products and services and 
hence represents increasing demands for coordination and interaction between the buyer and seller. To 
construct this scale, the 18 types of products were assigned to five categories by two experts. Category 
one represents the least need for coordination and interaction whereas category five the most. Category 
one, two, and three represent standard and more advanced products and services respectively. Category 
four represents specialized, and category 5 tailored, products or services. If multiple products were 
included in the same transaction, the highest category score was used to rate the complexity. The two 
indicators of transaction complexity, namely the count of products and the ratings measure correlate 
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with each other significantly (R=.68); yet the fact that the correlation is far from unity provides some 
evidence that they tap into different aspects of complexity. We then sum these two items to create our 
final measure that taps into increasing complexity in transactions.6 
Transaction size:  Transaction price refers to the original price in the contract excluding any 
follow-up work that might have been subsequently performed. Informants had to choose between five 
categories of costs that were measured in Dutch Guilders. In U.S. dollars, the approximate price 
categories are less than $15,000, between $15,000 and $30,000, between $30,000 and $60,000, 
between $60,000 and $120,000, and more than $120,000. 
Frequency of prior interaction:  This single item, five-point Likert scale measures how 
frequently the buyer has done business with the supplier prior to the focal transaction. 
Importance of transaction:  This two-item, five-point Likert scale reflects the value of the 
transacted products or services to the buyer. The two items measure the perceptions of the buyer on the 
importance of the products/services to the automation and profitability of the buying organization. 
Measurement Validity 
We used confirmatory factor analysis to assess unidimensionality and discriminant validity of our 
multi-item constructs and estimated a single model with three variables: transaction complexity, lock-
in, and measurement ambiguity. The model fit statistics were: χ2 (39) = 214.65; root mean squared 
error of approximation (RMSEA) = .067; CFI = .96; IFI = .96; NFI = .95 suggesting a reasonably well 
fitting measurement model. Furthermore, all the factor loadings were significant at p < .01 level; 
providing evidence of convergent validity. We also conducted Harman’s one factor test (Podsakoff and 
Organ 1986) to determine if one factor could adequately account for the variance. The model (χ2 (45) = 
2428.63, RMSEA = .27, CFI = .45, IFI = .46, NFI = .45) falls below the acceptable levels of fit and 
suggests that the observed variance cannot be explained by one underlying factor. Furthermore, since 
many of the measures can be objectively verified (i.e. not perceptual measures), we expected a priori 
that any possible common method bias would be minimal. 
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We used Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) procedure to assess discriminant validity. Specifically, 
we calculated the average variance extracted and compared the square root of this to the inter-construct 
correlations. Table 1 shows that the square root of the average variances extracted, where they could 
be calculated, exceeds the inter-construct correlations suggesting that each construct shares more 
variance with its own measures than with other constructs. The reliability of the scales, calculated 
using Cronbach’s Alpha, were found to be adequate. These measures are provided in Appendix 1. 
Contract Specificity Analysis 
Our dataset contains observations from buying organizations that provided data on one or two separate 
IT transactions. Given this, we conduct two separate sets of analysis to show robustness. In the first, 
we make use of the entire dataset to estimate the contract specificity choice and subsequent 
performance effects. In the second, we estimate the contract specificity and performance effects using 
data from firms that report on two transactions. This enables us to account for firm-specific effects and 
provides a stronger test of our hypotheses. We first report on the analysis for the whole dataset below. 
The latter analysis is reported in a separate sub-section on “controlling for firm-specific effects”. 
Given the presence of one and two data points per firms, we used Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) as our estimation technique. FGLS enables the clustering of data using a firm 
identification variable (in our case, firms with either 1 or 2 responses) and accounts for the inter-
correlation between multiple observations per firm. It also estimates the error structure (Beck and Katz 
1995; Wooldridge 2001), making the results less sensitive to unexpected error distributions, including 
potential heteroskedasticity. Operationally, we used the XTGLS module in STATA 9.2 to implement 
FGLS and used a firm identification variable to cluster organizations that provided data on two 
transactions. For firms that provide two data-points, the data collection process involved an informant 
who provided data on one transaction first followed by data on a second, separate, transaction. This 
may give rise to various issues analogous to classical within-subject designs such as practice, carry-
over effects, or genuine differences between within-subject observations. Therefore, we include a 
  
 
17 
dummy to identify the second observation for each firm as a control for possible effects that may make 
such repeat transactions different. In essence, we deal with issues related to firm-specific effects 
through the dummy while simultaneously taking into account the clustered nature of our data. The 
model used to estimate contract specificity is shown in Equation 1 below. 
(1) Contract specificity = β0+ β1* Lock-in + β2* Transaction complexity + β3* Measurement 
ambiguity + β4* Transaction size + β5* Frequency of prior interaction + β6* Importance of 
transaction + β7* Dummy + η 
Model 1 in Table 2 shows the results for our core predictors. We find that consistent with H1 
and H2, contracts become more specific as buyer lock-in with the vendor’s product/technology 
increases ( = .187, p < .01) and as transaction complexity increases ( = .141, p < .01). In contrast, 
the results were opposite to our prediction in H3; contracts become less specific as it becomes more 
difficult to evaluate the product ex ante ( = .109, p < .05). One potential reason could be that the 
costs faced by the buying firms in evaluating and comparing product features and writing more 
comprehensive contracts to assure value delivery ex post are higher than the hazards posed from less 
detailed contracts. Model 2 provides the estimates for our full model as specified in equation 1 where 
we add four control variables: size of transaction, frequency of prior interaction, importance of the 
transaction, and a dummy variable indicating whether the data is from a buying firm that provided one 
versus two data points. The core variables again remain strongly significant and directionally 
consistent. In addition, as the size of transaction increase, contracts become more specific ( = .481, p 
< .01). The impact of the dummy is marginally significant ( = .587, p < .10) suggesting that firms 
providing data on two transactions used more specific contracts than firms providing data on one 
transaction did. The effect of other control variables was insignificant.7 
---------------------Table 2 about here--------------------- 
Performance Analysis 
As contract specificity is endogenous to variations in transaction hazards, we need to account for this   
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endogeneity while assessing the performance implications.8 To confirm this theoretical rationale, we 
first establish empirically whether endogeneity is an issue in our context by conducting the standard 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). Specifically, we computed the residual, 
ˆ , from equation 1 (estimated from Table 2, Model 2) and used this residual as an additional regressor 
in the two cost equations – ex post transaction and ex ante contracting costs – after incorporating all 
the independent variables in Model 2, Table 2, minus the importance of transaction, for identification 
purposes. The parameter estimate for the residual was highly significant (p < .01) in both cost 
equations, clearly indicating that contract specificity is endogenous in our setting. 
 Having established the existence of endogeneity, we now use two different approaches to test 
H4 and H5 while simultaneously accounting for the endogeneity. The first approach, which we call the 
whole residual analysis, tests whether the cost impact of the overall deviations from expected contract 
specificity is consistent with H4 and H5. The second approach, which we call the split residual 
analysis, tests whether cost impact of positive and negative deviations are, independently and 
separately, consistent with the stated hypotheses. We turn to the task below. 
Whole Residual Analysis:  This technique was proposed by Garen (1984; 1988) to correct for selection 
bias and is especially useful when lack of “good” instrumental variables makes standard IV approaches 
problematic. The Garen procedure is a modification of the Heckman-Lee two-stage discrete choice 
estimator (Heckman 1979) and specifically accounts for the continuous nature of our selection variable 
– contract specificity. Accordingly, we first obtain the residual from equation 1 (ˆ ) and then compute 
the interaction term ˆ x Contract Specificity. The coefficient of the ˆ term is of key interest to us 
because it provides the direction for the selection bias. Specifically, a negative coefficient would 
suggest that increases in ˆ  decreases costs and vice versa. The ˆ x Contract Specificity term accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity over the range of the continuous selection variable. The residual and the 
interaction term, along with the selection variable and its interactions with key exogenous variables 
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from stage 1, are then used as regressors in the performance analysis to implement the Garen 
procedure. We used FGLS to estimate each of our two performance/cost equations given below.   
(2) Ex post Transaction Costs = 0+ 1* Contract Specificity +  2* ˆ +  3*ˆ * Contract Specificity + 
 4*Lock-in * Contract Specificity +  5* Transaction Complexity * Contract Specificity +  6* 
Measurement ambiguity * Contract Specificity + 
(3) Ex ante Contracting Costs = 0+ 1* Contract Specificity +  2* ˆ +  3* ˆ * Contract Specificity 
+  4*Lock-in * Contract Specificity +  5* Transaction Complexity * Contract Specificity +  6* 
Measurement ambiguity * Contract Specificity +  
 Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results for ex post transaction costs. The coefficient of ˆ is 
negative and significant ( = 0.284, p < 0.01), showing that contracts that were more specific than 
expected lowered ex post transaction costs and vice versa. The coefficient for the term ˆ x Contract 
Specificity term is significant and negative ( = 0.122, p < 0.05).  As would be expected, the main 
effect of the endogenous, predicted level of contract specificity (that accounts for lock-in, transaction 
complexity, and measurement ambiguity) is positive and significant ( = 1.512, p < 0.01). All other 
effects in Model 1 are insignificant. 
---------------------Table 3 about here--------------------- 
 Model 3 in Table 3 show the results for ex ante contracting costs. Here we find that the 
coefficient of ˆ is positive and significant ( = 0.014, p < 0.01) indicating that contracts that were 
more specific than expected increased ex ante contracting costs and vice versa.  The coefficient for the 
ˆ x Contract Specificity term ( = 0.006, p > 0.10) is insignificant. We also find that per expectations, 
higher levels of endogenous, predicted level of contract specificity leads to higher ex ante contracting 
costs ( = 0.223, p < 0.01). Finally, the interaction effect of transaction complexity and contract 
specificity is the only other significant effect ( = 0.011, p < 0.01).    
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For both models, we also used the Ramsey RESET test (Ramsey 1969; Wooldridge 2001) to 
investigate the presence of non-linearity in the effect of ˆ on costs. The results (p > 0.10) indicate that 
the presence of non-linearity is unlikely. 
Split Residual Analysis:  Even though the RESET test shows no evidence of non-linearity using the 
overall residual, there might exist some asymmetries if the cost impact of positive and negative 
deviations is estimated separately. This also provides an independent test for H4 and H5. To do so, we 
use a technique used in previous marketing (e.g., Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Zeithaml et al 1996) 
and organizational studies (e.g., Berkowitz et al 2006; Rosen 2004). Specifically, if the residual from 
the contract specificity estimation (Model 2 in Table 2) for a given observation is ηi, we define and 
construct positive and negative residuals as follows: 
Negative = |ηi | if ηi < 0, else 0 and 
Positive = ηi if ηi > 0, else 0. 
We then separately estimate equation 4 for each of the two cost measures using these split 
residuals. We use the predicted level of contract specificity to proxy for the transaction attributes and 
include the interaction terms.   
4)  Ex ante/Ex post Costs = a0+ a1* Positive + a2* Negative + 3* Contract Specificity +  4*Lock-in 
* Contract Specificity +  5* Transaction Complexity * Contract Specificity +  6* Measurement 
ambiguity * Contract Specificity + a7*Dummy +  
Model 2 in Table 3 shows the results for ex post costs. Using a one-tailed test for our 
directional hypotheses, H4 and H5, we find that as hypothesized, the impact of Positive is negative and 
significant ( = 0.404, p < 0.01), suggesting that contracts that are more specific than expected 
lowered ex post transaction costs. In contrast, the impact of Negative is not significant ( = 0.131, p > 
0.10).  Likewise, model 4 in Table 3 provides the results for ex ante contracting costs. Using a one-
tailed test we find that the impact of both Positive ( = 0.016, p < 0.05) and Negative ( = 0.012, p < 
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0.10) to be directionally consistent with the hypotheses and significant suggesting that contracts that 
were more (less) specific than expected had marginally higher (lower) expenditure of managerial 
effort. Further, consistent with the findings in the whole residual analysis, the impact of the expected 
level of contract specificity is strongly significant and positive for both cost measures.  
In sum, using two different approaches to handle endogeneity – the  whole and split residual 
analysis – we find that results are generally consistent with expectations. They also provide two key 
insights on governance costs. First, in line with past findings (Pilling, Crosby and Jackson 1994), more 
complex transactions (that are supported by more specific contracts) have higher ex ante and ex post 
costs. Deviating from the expected level of governance, however, leads to a crucial divergence in the 
impact on the two cost metrics. In particular, contracts that are more (less) specific than expected 
lowered (raised) ex post transaction problems but raised (lowered) ex ante contracting costs. These 
subtle findings are a critical element of the governance logic espoused in TCE. 
Controlling for Firm-Specific Effects 
Recall that we have a substantial number of buying firms that provided data on two IT transactions. 
Here, we assess the robustness of our results by explicitly accounting for firm-specific heterogeneity 
using data obtained from this sub-sample of firms that provided two observations.  To capitalize on the 
strength of this data, we first constructed a “balanced panel” with information on all variables for both 
observations of each buying firm. This provided us 210 (105 firms times 2) observations. We then 
estimated a set of random effects models using GLS (Greene 2003) using the Garen specification to 
explain the choice of contract specificity and the subsequent effects on ex ante and ex post costs.9 For 
each firm, the more recent of the two transactions was coded as the “Dummy for second observation” 
and introduced in these models. This helps us to investigate any systematic time-related effects. 
Equations 5, 6, and 7 show the specification for these models using the Garen (whole-residual)  
procedure.   
(5) Contract specificity = β0it+ β1it* Lock-in + β2it* Transaction complexity + β3it* Measurement   
  
 
22 
ambiguity + β4it* Transaction size + β5it* Frequency of prior interaction + β6it* Importance of 
transaction + β7it* Dummy for second observation + σui + σeit 
(6) Ex post transaction costs = 0it+ 1it* Contract specificity +  2it* ˆ +  3it*ˆ * Contract specificity 
+  4it*Lock-in * Contract specificity +  5it* Transaction complexity * Contract Specificity +  6it* 
Measurement ambiguity * Contract Specificity +  7it* Dummy for second observation + σui + σeit 
(7) Ex ante contracting costs = 0it+ 1it* Contract Specificity +  2it* ˆ +  3it* ˆ * Contract 
specificity +  4it*Lock-in * Contract specificity +  5it* Transaction complexity * Contract 
specificity +  6it* Measurement ambiguity * Contract specificity + 7it Dummy for second 
observation + σui + σeit 
 σui is the firm-specific error term (unobserved heterogeneity) and σeit is the model error with the 
i and t subscripts referring to the individual firms and the two measurement waves respectively. The 
intra-class correlation (the correlation of between-transactions communality for the same firm) is given 
by ρ and calculated as = σu
2/(σu
2 + σe
2). 
Table 4 shows the results. The value of ρ is quite significant for the contract specificity and ex 
ante costs equations suggesting strong firm-fixed effects. Overall, we again observe that buyers choose 
the level of contract specificity to mitigate hazards arising from safeguarding and adaptation problems. 
The coefficient for the dummy in the contract specificity equation ( = 0.859, p < 0.05) suggests that 
contracts were more specific for the more recent transaction.  The cost effects again show evidence of 
selection bias and deviation effects that are consistent with previously reported results. The coefficient 
for ˆ is negative and significant for ex post costs ( = 0.311, p < 0.05) and positive and significant 
for ex ante costs ( = 0.026, p < 0.01). Overall, these results again suggest that the chosen level of 
contract specificity is a trade-off that balances ex ante contracting costs with ex post transaction 
problems. 
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DISCUSSION 
The foundation of governance theories is that for a given level of transactional attributes, governance 
levels are chosen to reflect a trade-off between the costs and benefits of setting up those structures. 
Deviating from this expected level, that accounts for transactional attributes, should then reveal a 
distinct pattern of effects on two counter-balancing dimensions of costs – ex ante contracting costs and 
ex post transaction problems. An analysis of micro-level details in IT contracts provides results 
consistent with this subtle but key principle. The results hold even after we control for unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity.  We consider the research and managerial implications in turn. 
Implications for Research 
Our deviation-based joint analysis makes several important contributions. First, we provide the first 
explicit demonstration that ex ante contracting costs can prevent parties from seeking governance 
arrangements that lower ex post transaction costs. Consistent with theory (Williamson 1991) and past 
evidence (Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson 1994) we find that both ex ante and ex post costs go up as 
transactions become more complex.  However, after controlling for transactional attributes, we find a 
more discriminating result. In general we find that contracts that are more specific than expected have 
lower ex post costs but higher ex ante costs and vice versa. 
 Second, our joint analyses enhance our understanding on why parties choose a particular level 
of governance.  For instance, using similar kind of deviation analysis, Rosen (2004) and Bercovitz et 
al. (2006) find that unexpectedly higher relational norms improve performance – the implication being 
that parties could have done better had they chosen to be even more relational. However, they ignore 
the cost of constructing those higher than expected norms.  Similarly, Leiblein et al. (2002) find that 
misaligned hierarchical governance (make) when theory predicts contractual governance (buy) 
enhances technological performance; however, they too ignore the administrative costs of internalizing 
the transaction. These studies did not find significant effects for less than expected levels of 
governance; hence, their results suggest a tantalizing conclusion: Only over-coordinated governance 
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structures are more valuable vis-à-vis their theory-predicted levels. This begs the question: Why then 
would any transaction be not over-coordinated?  Our joint analysis of the tension between the costs 
and benefits of contracting reintroduces the basic symmetry that is consistent with TCE: Both over-
coordinated and under-coordinated governance structures have counter-balancing costs and benefits 
vis-à-vis their theory-predicted levels, providing a rationale for why contracting parties might not 
universally over or under-coordinate. We believe, our results make a cogent argument for evaluating 
such governance misalignment effects on multiple dimensions of performance; especially those that 
can be theoretically predicted to counter-balance each other. 
 Third, our data shows the problem in directly comparing the costs without accounting for the 
role of contracts and transaction attributes. To wit, consider a seemingly reasonable conjecture that 
time and effort spend in writing more precise contracts would lower ex post costs. Table 1, however, 
shows that the correlation between the two costs is significant and positive (0.231). This may seem 
anomalous; yet is as per expectations if we consider that contract specificity and these two costs are 
jointly determined. In particular, when transactions are simple, not only the ex post costs but also the 
upfront costs of writing precise terms are low and the value of contracts is quite trivial. In contrast, 
when transactions become more hazardous (higher lock-in, complexity, etc.), ex post problems are 
likely to be higher and far-sighted firms, desiring to control these costs, would consciously put more 
effort and incur higher costs in constructing more detailed contracts. This logic is consistent with the 
entire pattern of observed correlations between attributes, contract specificity, ex ante and ex post costs 
in Table 1. In short, our results demonstrate the conceptual importance of correcting for endogeneity of 
contract form. Without accounting for this endogeneity, researchers would spuriously conclude that 
contracts that are more specific per se lead to higher ex ante and ex post costs.      
Fourth, and relatedly, our results suggest that it is not necessarily true that an absolute level 
(high or low) of governance is better (or worse).  For instance, past research (e.g., Zaheer, McEvily, 
and Perrone 1998) has reported that stronger norms of trustworthiness improve performance. However, 
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this does not rule out the possibility that stronger than average norms in a particular instance might be 
insufficiently strong (for given attribute levels) and influence performance differently. Indeed Uzzi 
(1996) provides some evidence that performance declines beyond a certain level of relational norms; 
however, he does not specify why and where the crossover point comes into being. Consistent with 
Bercovitz et al. (2006), we argue that a fit analysis that accounts for transaction attributes is more 
appropriate to test the governance-performance link.  How then do we reconcile these two approaches?  
We appeal for a more discriminating theoretical examination of what we mean by attributes and 
governance.  In their analysis of inter-firm trust and performance, Gulati and Nickerson (2008) show 
the need to separate preexisting trust (an exogenous attribute of the exchange) from trust that is 
engineered to account for exchange hazards (an endogenous governance form). The former, exogenous 
trust could grease the wheels of friction and improve a relevant performance dimension (e.g., 
opportunism) regardless of other exchange hazards. In contrast, endogenous (calculative) trust should 
be amenable to the “fit” analysis. Formal contracts too might have a preexisting disposition. Nordberg 
et al. (1996), for instance, note that by law, CERN – the European Laboratory for Particle Physics – 
contracts are rigid, pre-designed policies that are not sensitive to variations in transactional hazards. 
We argue for a conceptual parsing of the exogenous attribute-type and endogenous governance-type 
effects of “nominal governance forms” for a better understanding on how firms organize their 
transactions to realize better performance. 
Finally, even though addressing endogeneity concerns is not new (e.g., Anderson 1988), our 
approach based on the whole-residual technique (e.g., Garen 1984) and the split-residual technique 
(Anderson and Sullivan 1993) has received relatively less attention hitherto in organizational studies. 
We believe these approaches could be fruitfully applied in a variety of marketing and inter-firm 
contexts where soft relational or hard contractual structures are measured using a continuous metric.  
Do choices that deviate from theory predictions have adverse implications in these contexts?  A 
systematic empirical analysis of these issues would give us a better understanding on the role of  
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governance in exchange performance.  
Implications for Practice 
Consider the recent Wall Street Journal article that documents the Goldilocks dilemma faced by a 
company on how to strike the right balance between “too little” versus “too much” contracting for IT 
procurement (Barthelemy 2008). We pose as “Governance Value Engineers” (Gilson 1984) and argue 
that designing a contractual framework should not be a task delegated to lawyers alone. Rather, sales 
and purchasing managers need to understand how contract design support value-creating activities in 
inter-firm relationships like IT sourcing. Based on our results, we offer the following advice. 
We start by asserting that buyer-managers need to be aware of the costs and benefits of striking 
loose versus rigid contract terms. Writing more detailed contracts enables managers to set goals, 
clarify expectations, lower misunderstandings, and reduce the counter-party’s range of opportunistic 
behavior. Ex post implementation costs are hence likely to be lower. However, drafting contracts that 
are more detailed would also require valuable expenditure in managerial time and effort in searching 
for information, projecting scenarios, identifying feasible contingencies, and negotiating mutually 
acceptable solutions. In contrast, keeping contract terms open enables parties to make value-enhancing 
adjustments and is likely to foster trust because parties do not hold each other to precise terms of the 
contract; however, opportunistic counter-parties can exploit unspecified loopholes that lead to wasteful 
hold-up and renegotiations. We encourage managers to build an expertise in evaluating these contract 
design issues, as they would clearly help in constructing cost efficient yet effective contracts. 
  Furthermore, our framework argues that it is crucial for managers to understand the properties 
of the transaction under consideration.  Transactions that involve high lock-in to the vendor’s product, 
that are more complex, and those where a clear-cut criterion to evaluate the vendor’s products is not 
available upfront are quite likely to generate implementation hazards for the buyer. Buyer managers 
should be aware that compared to simpler transactions, such inherently complex transactions will not 
only require valuable managerial time and effort in constructing contract terms but are also likely to 
  
 
27 
have more problems in the contract execution stage. Constructing contracts that are de-coupled from 
the essential nature of the transaction are not likely to be effective. We suggest a three-step decision 
frame to address these issues.  
First, managers need to assess the hazards posed by transactional attributes. If these hazards 
are low, managers need not expend effort in constructing complex, detailed contracts. On the other 
hand, if the transactional hazards are high managers need to be more selective because managing such 
transactions leads to higher ex ante and ex post costs. As such, managers need to balance both these 
costs with the value-added from entering into such transactions in the first place. For instance, they 
need to assess whether the improvements in productivity and cost-efficiency from procuring 
customized hardware/software configurations is worth the potential costs of managing these 
transactions. Second, if the value-added from productivity improvements are substantial, managers 
need to balance the ex ante versus ex post costs.  For instance, depending on particularistic contexts, 
crafting “too rigid” contracts might be beneficial because reduction in the ex post implementation 
problems overcome the added managerial costs of writing these contracts in sufficient details. 
Crucially, the level of “rigidity” has to reflect the level of transactional hazards posed in the 
particularistic. In short, contract managers need to construct contracts that are not too costly to design, 
yet are specific enough to reduce hazards.  Third, given that complex transactions require high 
management effort, it would be useful to build in realistic expectations. Projects involving the 
procurement of complex, customized products/services are likely to take time in “fixing the bugs”; 
hence, it is advisable that provisions be made for such slack.    
Finally, our results show that prior interaction with vendors helps reduce the costs of 
contracting and buyer-managers need to consider it while choosing IT vendors. However, the impact 
of transactional attributes on cost holds even after we control for this frequency of prior interaction. 
This validates our core argument that contracts reflecting current conditions and properties are critical 
to the success of IT procurement because they help organize and set the expectations between the  
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buyer and seller.    
Limitations 
Our research has several limitations.  First, our results are context dependent and one has to exercise 
caution in generalizing our results and insights in other domains.  Second, our study focuses on only 
one form of governance structure, namely contract specificity and its antecedents and performance 
implications.  It is conceivable that investigating other feasible governance structures might provide 
different results.  Third, the use of secondary datasets to test complex theoretical models has its own 
limitations.  For instance, our measures of lock-in and transaction complexity could have alternative 
interpretations, leading to potential issues with construct validity. Moreover, secondary datasets bring 
along other limitations such as the possible exclusion of important measures and typically an inability 
to go back to the original providers of the data to seek further information on measures.     
Fourth, even though our results strongly suggest that buying firms do trade-off between these 
two costs while choosing their level of contract specificity, the explicit trade-off points are not 
obvious.  An analysis of the actual monetary costs of writing contracts that are more specific and of ex 
post transaction problems would enable a direct assessment of the efficiency of contractual choices.  
Fifth, our archival dataset did not permit us to investigate other dimensions of performance.  For 
instance, even though we show the ex ante costs and ex post hazards from lock-in, complexity, and 
measurement difficulty, the benefits that buying firms derive from supplier-specific investments (that 
create lock-in) or buying complex products that require intense coordination between the parties are 
not investigated in our tests.  Hence, an equally important strategic question, viz. “Why do buying 
firms want hazardous transactions that increase their ex ante and ex post costs?” remains unanswered 
in our analysis.  Finally, we look at our problem using data obtained from the buying organization.  An 
analysis of vendor-side data might provide different results and insights.  We hope that future studies 
will address these issues.
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Ex post transaction problems -         
2. Ex ante contracting costs .231 -        
3. Contract specificity .079 .167 .83       
4. Buyer lock-in .251 .179 .200 .80      
5. Transaction complexity .222 .118 .171 .297 -     
6. Measurement ambiguity .391 .124 .015 .324 .265 .84    
7. Transaction size .222 .251 .246 .368 .380 .247 -   
8. Frequency of prior interaction 
interaction 
-.111 -.056 -.055 -.089 -.028 -.162 -.026 -  
9. Importance .068 .195 .170 .344 .219 .154 .360 -.019 
 
- 
Mean 18.748 3.760 13.994 11.214 8.521 8.681 2.621 1.561 6.407 
Standard deviation 7.948 8.195 3.633 3.779 4.292 2.631 1.449 1.838 1.639 
Minimum 11.000 0.000 3.000 4.000 0.000 3.000 1.000 0.000 2.000 
Maximum 46.000 120.00
0 
23.000 20.000 20.000 15.000 5.000 5.000 10.00
0 Other sample descriptors: Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of employees 83.249 16.228 1 6000 
Length of relationship with supplier (months) 6.338 
 
2.754 
 
0 85 
Percentage of firms where a separate organizational 
department is present 
Purchasing (N=257), IT (N=245), Legal (N=46)  
Key organizational activity Agriculture( N=11), Raw materials (N=95), Parts production (N=167), Energy 
(N=5), Construction (N=65), Retailing (N=179), Travel and transport (N=137), 
Services (N=172), (semi) Government (N=128) 
Correlation matrix for N=718, Correlations over |.08| are significant at p<.05, 2-sided 
Values in bold on the diagonal are the square root of the average variances extracted. 
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TABLE 2: DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACT SPECIFICITY 
 
 Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses 
Variables Contract specificity  
(Model 1) 
Contract specificity  
(Model 2) 
Constant 11.511(.505) *** 10.941(.661) *** 
Buyer lock-in
 a
 .187(.037) *** .134(.039) *** 
Transaction complexity
 a
 .141(.031) *** .089(.033) *** 
Measurement ambiguity
 a
 -.109(.051) ** -.141(.052) *** 
Transaction size   .481(.103) *** 
Frequency of prior interaction   -.095(.070)  
Importance of transaction   .116(.086)  
Dummy for second observation .481(.328)  .587(.329) * 
     
Model fit  Wald χ2=63.14 Wald χ
2
=98.17 
Estimation method FGLS (N=835) FGLS (N=808) 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
a: We use one-tailed tests for these posited directional hypotheses. 
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TABLE 3: IMPACT ON EX POST TRANSACTION PROBLEMS AND EX ANTE 
CONTRACTING COSTS 
Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses 
Variables Ex post 
transaction 
problems (1) 
Ex post 
transaction 
problems (2) 
Ex ante 
contracting costs 
(3) 
Ex ante 
contracting 
costs (4) 
Constant 18.790(.371) *** 19.162 (.498) *** .286(.022) *** .281(.030) *** 
Contract specificity  1.512(.221) *** 1.482 (.223) *** .223(.013) *** .224(.014) *** 
𝜂 a -.284(.078) ***   .014(.005) ***   
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 a   -.404 (.154) ***   .016(.009) ** 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 a   .131 (.137)    -.012(.009) * 
𝜂  * Contract specificity -.122(.061) **   .006(.004)    
Buyer lock-in * Contract 
specificity 
-.094(.061)  -.091 (.062)  -.002(.004)  -.002(.004)  
Transaction complexity * 
Contract specificity 
.050(.056)  .049 (.056)  -.011(.003) *** -.011(.003) *** 
Measurement ambiguity * 
Contract specificity 
-.004(.085)  -.004 (.085)  -.003(.005)  -.003(.005)  
Dummy for second 
observation 
-.126(.712)  -.067 (.714)  .082(.044) * .085(.044) * 
Model fit Wald χ
2
=65.84 Wald χ
2
=62.86 Wald χ
2
=294.72 Wald χ
2
=291.87 
Estimation method FGLS (N=790) FGLS (N=790) FGLS (N=727) FGLS (N=727) 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
a: We use one-tailed tests for these posited directional hypotheses. 
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TABLE 4: ACCOUNTING FOR UNOBSERVED FIRM-SPECIFIC HETEROGENEITY 
 Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses 
Variables Contract specificity (1) Ex post 
transaction costs (2) 
Ex ante 
contracting costs (3) 
Constant 10.261(1.300) *** 18.585(.925) *** .316(.049) *** 
Contract specificity 
a
   .843(.434) ** .181(.022) *** 
𝜂  a   -.311(.162) ** .026(.009) *** 
𝜂  * Contract specificity   -.091(.113)  .006(.006)  
Buyer lock-in * Contract specificity   -.025(.123)  .007(.006)  
Transaction complexity * Contract 
specificity 
  .042(.104)  -.008(.005)  
Measurement ambiguity * Contract 
specificity 
  -.265(.153) * -.008(.008)  
Buyer lock-in
 a
 .093(.080)      
Transaction complexity
 a
 .105(.061) **     
Measurement ambiguity
 a
 -.139(.102) *     
Transaction size .524(.198) ***     
Frequency of prior interaction -.141(.135)      
Importance of transaction .236(.169)      
Dummy for second observation .859(.421) ** 1.229(.137)  -.100(.049) ** 
σu 1.795 2.463 .295 
σe 3.024 7.850 .329 
ρb .260 .090 .446 
Model fit Wald χ2=36.47 Wald χ2=13.67 Wald χ2=82.48 
Estimation method GLS, random effects 
(N=210) 
GLS, random effects 
(N=210) 
GLS, random effects 
(N=210) 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
a: We use one-tailed tests for these posited directional hypotheses. 
b: ρ is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component and calculated as ρ 
=σu
2/(σu
2
 + σe
2
) 
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APPENDIX 1: MEASUREMENT SCALES AND ITEMSa  
 
Construct 
 
Items 
 
Contract Specificity 
 
Cronbach’s  = .67 
5-point scale (1 = very little; 5 = very much) 
Terms in the formal agreements are sometimes very detailed and specific and at 
other times left open. How specific were the contractual features with respect to 
the following: 
1. Implementation procedures 
2. Financial and legal conditions 
3. Technical specifications 
4. Agreement as a whole 
 
Buyer Lock-in 
 
Cronbach’s  = .76 
5-point scale (1 = very small; 5 = very large) 
1. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would be the loss, in 
terms of time and money, associated with purchasing a new product. 
2. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would be the loss, in 
terms of time and money, associated with training your personnel.  
3. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would be the loss, in 
terms of time and money, associated with data and information entry. 
4. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would be the loss, in 
terms of time and money, associated with stoppage at production 
departments.  
 
Transaction Complexity 
Binary Yes/No Response Format 
What are the different kinds of products/services procured under this agreement? 
(Multiple answers possible): 
1. standard software (1)b 
2. personal Computers (1) 
3. work-stations (1) 
4. peripherals (1) 
5. cabling (1) 
6. network configuration (2) 
7. mini-computer (2) 
8. mainframe (2) 
9. computer driven machines (2) 
10. industry specific software (3) 
11. education (3) 
12. instruction/training (3) 
13. documentation (3) 
14. support (4) 
15. specialized software (4) 
16. advice/consulting (4) 
17. design (5) 
18. customized software (5) 
Measurement Ambiguity 
 
Cronbach’s  = .80 
5-point scale (1 = very easy; 5 = very difficult) 
1. How difficult was it to judge the quality of the product/service at the time 
of delivery?  
2. How difficult was it to compare this product/service to similar products? 
3. How difficult was it to compare the price/quality ratio of potential 
suppliers’ products/services? 
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Transaction Size 
 
What was the initial contract price (in Dutch Guilders)? 
 
 
Frequency of Prior 
Interaction 
5-point scale (1 = very infrequently; 5 = very frequently) 
How frequently did your organization do business with this supplier prior to this 
focal transaction? 
 
 
Importance of 
Transaction 
 
5-point scale (1 = very little; 5 = very much) 
How important was this product for: 
1. The automation of your company. 
2. The profitability of your company. 
 
Ex post Transaction 
Problems
c 
5-point scale (1 = very little; 5 = very much) 
Listed below are some potential problems that could arise regarding the product, 
its delivery, and its service. Please indicate how severe the problems were for each 
of these items.  
1. Went over delivery schedule 
2. Went over price / budget 
3. Product incomplete 
4. Product to slow / limited 
5. Deviations from specifications made 
6. Incompatibility with other IT products 
7. Installation to hurried / sloppy 
8. Support to slow / too late 
9. Service too slow / late 
10. Necessary adjustments and customization too slow / late 
11. Incomplete / unclear documentation 
 
Ex ante Contracting 
Costs 
 
In number of working days, how much time did you and your colleagues spent on 
negotiating and drafting the agreement with this supplier? 
a: The original questionnaire was in Dutch. Items were translated into English by two individuals who 
were experts in English and Dutch. 
b: Numbers in parentheses reflect the ratings on task complexity for each of the products/services and 
represent increasing demand for coordination between the buyer and seller . 
c: Formative measure. 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1 The observed level might not mirror the expected level for a variety of reasons, including 
randomness, reputation and corporate culture (Kreps 1990), agency problems between different levels 
of managers, inertia, or even corporate policy.  For instance, many institutions (e.g., the US 
Department of Defense, General Motors Corporation, and the European Organization for Nuclear 
Research – CERN) have strict guidelines and policies on what is (or is not) permissible in written 
contracts. 
 
2
  Our context of “capital” IT equipment and software purchases should be distinguished from the 
“service-oriented” IT outsourcing sector where customer firms outsource the management, either 
partially or wholly, of their IT infrastructure administration, management, and maintenance. 
 
3
  For instance, in their analysis of the seminal United Shoe Machinery Corporation anti-trust case, 
Masten and Snyder (1993) document that the quality of these machines and associated after-sales 
service was critical to keep the shoe manufacturing operation functioning smoothly; yet the 
accounting cost of all these machines in a manufacturing operation/plant was barely 2% of the yearly 
revenue of the shoe manufacturers.  The shoe manufacturer’s contracting hazards are hence far 
greater than just the loss of the capitalized value of a non-performing equipment. 
 
4
  It is also important to note that it is precisely these deviations (or mistakes) that enable us to 
address the econometric identification considerations that are essential for the performance analysis. 
 
5
  See Batenburg, Ronald S., The External Management of Automation 1995.  Codebook. 
ISCORE/ICS, Utrecht University, 1997: Chapter A. 
 
6
  We have verified whether using either the first or the second indicator alone in our first stage 
equations resulted in significantly different findings.  All findings remained essentially the same. 
 
7
  We used the bootstrapping technique to assess robustness and cross validate our results (Cooil, 
Winer, and Rados 1987). The differences in standard errors between our FGLS and bootstrapping did 
not result in any significant changes in the reported values, thereby suggesting that the results were 
robust to distributional assumptions. 
 
8
  In our case, this endogeneity arises out of selectivity bias (Heckman 1979). However, 
endogeneity can also arise from other sources including omitted variables, unobserved measurement 
errors, and bi-directional causality (e.g., as seen in panel data when firms set advertising budgets 
based on past sales and current sales are impacted by current level of advertising expenditure). 
 
9
   We conducted a Hausman test to assess whether the difference in coefficients between our random 
effects model and an alternative fixed effects model were significant. Our results (p > 0.10) indicate 
this was not the case. Hence, consistent with common practice, we prefer and report the random 
effects models (Greene 2003). 
